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PRIVATE SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN JTPA
Introduction
One of the major strategic changes in federal employment and training 
policy represented by the replacement of CETA with JTPA is the strong role 
intended for the private sector under JTPA. Congress intended that private 
sector interests should be (at least) full partners with local elected 
officials in planning and shaping the employment and training program in the 
SDAs. This is manifest in the responsibilities vested in the Private Industry 
Councils as well as the requirement that the PIC actually be made up of a 
majority of private sector representatives.
There is also a strong, but not majority, voice mandated for the private 
sector at the state level. One-third of the seats on the Job Training 
Coordinating Councils are reserved for private sector participants. Thus the 
Job Training Partnership Act provides a very considerable role for the private 
sector in employment and training programs.
There are a number of reasons to expect an increased private sector role to 
change local employment and training programs. First, there is the common 
perception that private sector people are more "bottom-line" oriented. While 
employment and training programs are not usually operated by profit-making 
institutions, it is likely that the increased private sector influence could 
find expression in greater emphasis on measured results and greater dedication 
to efficiency goals as opposed to equity goals in the operation of the 
programs.
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Second, there is a conventional belief that private sector actors will tend 
to be less conscious of the political ramifications of particular programmatic 
decisions. This is not to assert that all local elected officials sought to 
use CETA resources in a way that benefited them politically. However, it is 
true that some programmatic decisions are easier if one does not have to be 
concerned with which local pressure group is not going to like the outcome.
Third, some feel that increasing the level of private sector participation 
will lead to less fraud and abuse of the programs. This is due both to the 
dilution of power in the hands of local elected officials and a willingness to 
"let the chips fall where they may" on the part of private sector 
participants. Thus the local sharing of power and responsibility for 
employment and training programs may provide a kind of "countervailing power" 
that prevents any one actor from gaining so much influence that opportunities 
for abuse are increased.,
Fourth, there is a widespread feeling that since the private sector is the 
source of most new job opportunities, they also are in a position to provide 
the best possible guidance when making decisions about potential skill-training 
programs. Since the private sector people know where the jobs of the future 
will be, it should be easy for them to forestall investment in programs that 
are not in tune with actual labor market needs.
Fifth, a closely related point is that since the private sector is creating 
the new job opportunities, close .connections with local training programs will 
have an immediate and obvious impact on placement results. The involvement of
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local private sector people in employment and training programs should help 
build both their awareness of and their commitment to these programs and their 
enrollees. Recruiting employers for on-the-job training (OJT) slots, for 
example, should be easier if there is strong local private sector "participation 
in the program.
Yet, there is also good reason to expect resistance to an increased private 
sector role in shaping local employment and training programs. Local elected 
officials were clearly in the driver's seat under CETA and undoubtedly many 
would seek a continuation of that role under JTPA. Just because the private 
sector is going to be a partner, they do not necessarily have to be<the senior 
partner. The passing of public sector employment under CETA certainly reduced 
the payoff to local elected officials from being in charge, but it did not 
eliminate it entirely.
Local service providers also likely would not welcome a major change in 
direction of the programs. Community based organizations (CBOs) were one of 
the first groups to express reservations about the advisability of including 
private sector attitudes in the employment and training sector. Perhaps this 
reflected historical concerns about discriminatory practices in the private 
sector, but it also reflects a very real disagreement over the programmatic 
philosophy that was to guide the targeting and participant selection decisions 
under JTPA. Clearly, vested interests had grown up around the local CETA 
programs and these were threatened by the new private sector interests that 
were joining the employment and training game.
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With this kind of political setting, great interest could be anticipated in 
the role the private sector would actually be playing at the end of the 
transition year. This chapter seeks to answer the following questions: To 
what extent have the wishes of the Congress actually been implemented in the 
states and in the local JTPA programs across the country? What is the actual 
role of the private sector in specific programs? Is there a common model of 
private sector participation? How much local variety is there? Who is playing 
the dominant role in shaping local JTPA programs in the SDAs? What is the 
trend in private sector participation through the first nine months of program 
implementation and experience?
Private Sector Participation at the State Level
As indicated earlier, one-third private sector membership is mandated on 
the State Job Training Coordinating Council (SJTCC) under JTPA. The Act also 
mandates representation of 20 percent from the general public, 20 percent from 
local government, and 20 percent from state legislatures and state agencies. 
In addition, the chairperson of the SJTCC must be a non-governmental 
representative. The specific role of the SJTCC in the 20 sample states is 
being described elsewhere in this report, the interest here centers on the 
extent to which the private sector members play a significant role in the 
actual operation of the SJTCC.
In Phase 1 of this study, it was reported that SJTCC roles varied 
considerably among the states in the sample. Further, it was reported that 
SJTCC roles fell into one of four broad categories: active and influential, 
active but still learning the process, dominated by the public sector
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representatives or staff, or purely advisory to the Governor. In this round, 
field associates were asked to characterize the role of the Council relative to 
that of the Governor and other state level actors. The specific focus for this 
question was putting together the PY 1984 state services plan.
Among the 20 sample states, 4 can unequivocally be put in the SJTCC primary 
group. In 9 of 20 states, associates reported that the Council was purely 
advisory to the Governor. The other 7 states were found to have Councils that 
were roughly co-equal with the Governor.
It is very clear that the private sector has played an important role on 
the SJTCC in those states where the Governor wished the JTPA program to be 
significantly different from CETA. According to an associate in a state with a 
strong Council and a strong private sector representation:
The role of the SJTCC has been more than purely an advisory one 
in this state. The Phase 1 report indicated a strong SJTCC and 
one that not only advised the Governor on JTPA matters, but also 
one that was deeply involved in detailed fund allocation 
procedures and programmatic matters.
While there was not a significantly abrupt change in the SJTCC's 
role in the PY84 services plan formulation over that of the 
Transition Year, it appears that there is a stronger emphasis now 
on the SJTCC acting as a policy and advisory body to the 
Governor, and as the "primary" approval agency for the state 
services plans. In essence, the SJTCC has emerged (in my 
opinion) to a position of primacy in policy matters.
Another example occurs in a state where the issues were rather slow to 
emerge but where the Council finally emerged with a major role:
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There is no longer any question that at this time, the role of 
the Council is primary. Initially, DOL did not (bother to) 
attend Council meetings, though the Labor Commissioner sits on 
it. Subsequently, requests from the Council to DOL both as its 
staff and as the JTPA administrator for information were handled 
poorly or not at all. This led to the greater involvement by the 
Governor's staff and the decision to clearly identify the'Council 
as the policy formulator with administration left to a stripped 
down DOL.
The causes of these conflicts are several. First, DOL was still 
trying to be what is was under CETA. A lack of early signals by 
the Governor helped explain some of this. Second, DOL seemed 
determined to lose as little staff as possible under JTPA.
Overall, the private sector participation in the SJTCC can be identified as 
strong or dominant in a total of 8 states. In 6 states the private sector has 
played a moderate role and in 6 the private sector has played only a weak 
role. What is most interesting is that of the 9 states where the SJTCC was 
judged to be purely advisory to the Governor, not one showed a strong pattern 
of private sector participation on the Council. On the other hand, among the 
remaining 11 states, 8 had a strong or even dominant private sector 
membership. Thus if the Governor wanted a different program from CETA, private 
sector influence seems to have been one of the ways to accomplish that.
There are other states where the Council has played a weak role:
The role of the council is primarily advisory to the staff. 
Clearly, the role of the governor and chief staff members has 
been much more important than the council in getting the program 
implemented. The council did not play an active role in planning 
for TY 83 or PY 84.
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An associate from another state reports:
Although JTPA officials and staff to the SJTCC have been careful 
to stress the policy role of the council, at this point it still 
appears to be more of an advisory body to the Governor than a 
co-equal partner with other state actors. This role is still 
evolving, however; the council had a more substantial role in 
developing the plan for PY 1984 and 85 than for the transition
year. i
Another pattern is represented by the following from an associate in a 
state where the Council has not played a very effective role and private sector 
participation has been weak:
Among the membership, elected officials rarely show up at 
meetings; legislators never. Private sector participation is 
limited to a few committed activists, and state agency heads 
almost always send representatives usually program people who 
are active in JTPA administration themselves. The two SDA 
directors on the Council are always there, and take a prominent 
part ,in meetings. So do DCCA staff, who attend committee and 
Council meetings in force. Thus, the Council is not a 
particularly independent force in JTPA policy and administration.
From the states with a roughly co-equal SJTCC role, the variety in private 
sector influence is very great. From one such state with a weak private sector 
role:
I characterize the role of the State Council as co-equal. Thus 
far, all of its recommendations have been accepted by the State 
staff and the Governor. An explicit decision has been made to 
follow the recommendations of the State Council and none of its 
recommendations have yet been rejected. Still, the State Council 
has not exercised its authority in any wholesale manner. It has, 
for the most part, deferred to the State staff in the development 
of the plan for program year 1984. The State staff for JTPA 
clearly had the dominant role in putting together the State 
services plan for both the transition year and program year 1984.
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Another associate reports a growing role for the SJTCC:
The role of the SJTCC during the early days of the Transition 
Year was primarily reactive. As noted in the Phase 1 report, the 
SJTCC tended to adopt the state administrative staffs' 
recommendations with minor revisions. Toward the end of the TY, 
there was evidence the Council had begun to occupy more of a 
co-equal position. As one top level administrator put it, "The 
staff has to earn it (passage of its recommendations) every step 
of the way now.".
Yet these same two states show opposite patterns in terms of private sector 
involvement. From the former with weak private sector participation:
The role of the private sector members of the State Council is 
becoming a problem. It is clear that the public sector members 
of the Council have greater interest in JTPA and their role on 
the Council is dominant. The private sector members have not 
been active and even their attendance at State Council meetings 
has been exceedingly poor. The State has not yet devised a way 
to actively involve private sector representatives in the State 
Council or, more generally, in JTPA at the State level.
From the latter with strong private sector participation:
The private sector members of the SJTCC are currently among the 
Council's more active and vociferous members. Their role has 
increased since the Phase 1 report for several reasons. First, 
they have become knowledgeable about the program. Second, key 
private sector members have assumed committee leadership 
positions. Third, the Governor has personally encouraged his 
private sector appointees to actively participate in SJTCC 
activities.
There is still a lot of variation among the states in the role of the SJTCC 
and in the role of the private sector members on the Council. It is clear, 
however, that where private sector participation is strong, the role of the 
Council tends to be strong as well.
 Another issue is the trend in private sector involvement at the Council 
level. Because of the heavy responsibilities of the SJTCC in the early stages 
of JTPA implementation, there has been interest in whether the private sector 
people would retain their commitment after the big policy decisions were made. 
On the other hand, some questioned whether private sector participants were 
knowledgeable enough to make a contribution in the early program decisions and 
whether they would stick to it long enough to make a difference in the 
programs.
So the question is whether private sector participation has increased or 
decreased over the transition year. Again, the situation in the states can be 
very different and the overall responsibility of the SJTCC may not have 
decreased during the transition year. Yet the field results show that private 
sector involvement has increased in 3 states, decreased in 5 states, and shows 
no particular trend in 12 states.
A midwestern state with an advisory council demonstrates the pattern of 
increasing private sector involvement with greater program familiarity:
The private sector involvement appears to be increasing somewhat 
now that these members are better acquainted with JTPA. They are 
beginning to identify those policy issues that require their 
attention.
It is not clear whether the degree of private sector participation is 
related to the trend in interest, although 3 of the 5 states showing a decrease 
in private sector involvement were those with weak private sector participation 
to begin with. This is illustrated by the following comment from an associate
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in a state with a moderately strong Council but little private sector 
participation:
The only trend in the composition of the private sector 
membership on the Council is that they tend to be almost entirely 
small businessmen. None of the State's major employers are 
represented. There is a clear trend toward a waning of interest 
of the private sector, which was not strong to start with. 
Initially, I had thought the private sector representatives were 
quiet because they were learning JTPA but now it appears that 
their lack of involvement indicates a lack of interest. The 
private sector representatives do not control any of the 
committees and their attendance at meetings has been extremely 
weak.
On the other hand, from a state with a strong private sector commitment, 
the following illustrates the decline in SJTCC "action" in general:
At the most recent meetings, though, only two of the six private 
sector members attended and only seven members altogether. Now 
meeting only every other month, the July Council meeting was 
cancelled. Fewer Council meetings were bound to result once the 
program was operational, but we sense some tapering off of 
involvement, more so by private sector members.
This is also reflected in the following report from a state with a moderate 
private sector participation rate:
While private sector membership has not changed appreciably, some 
disturbing trends are developing. The most notable trend is the 
increased presence of alternates at formal Council meetings. 
This trend exists among both private sector and other sector 
representatives, with no discernible differential among the 
classes of membership. During the July meeting, eleven of thirty 
seats were occupied by alternates. At this meeting SDA plans 
were reviewed and submitted to Council for approval. It would 
appear that Council members are not willing to travel distances 
to attend a three-hour meeting without first receiving an agenda 
and/or documents relevant to the discharge of their duties.
Perhaps the best conclusion to draw from these observations is simply that 
if you give people an important role to play, they will be active. Since
 public sector actors on SJTCC are more likely to be actively involved in the 
JTPA program, special attention is needed to make sure that the Council has a 
role that is significant enough to involve private sector people and to keep 
them motivated. The program does seem to have acquired a significant input 
from the private sector. The challenge is to keep it.
The last issue to be addressed is the link between JTPA and economic 
development efforts in the states. It was reported in Phase 1 that this was a 
primary factor in seeking strong private sector involvement in the SJTCC. The 
use of JTPA as a tool for economic development was reported as an issue in 14 
of the 20 states observed. After the transition year, it is appropriate to ask 
how this turned out.
From the responses in Phase 2, it would seem that there may have been more 
rhetoric than reality to the JTPA-economic development link. In only a few 
states can a strong link between economic development goals and JTPA program 
parameters be discerned. In one of these states, conventional devices were 
used in a rather aggressive way by the Governor:
The Governor clearly acknowledged that the link between JTPA and 
economic development is the primary focus in the state. This was 
accomplished by retaining control over Title III funds in a 
statewide program and using all of the 8 percent set-aside for 
customized training. In addition, the Governor's coordination 
criteria require that SDAs reserve 10 percent of their IIA 
allocation for additional customized training programs within 
their areas. This thrust was reinforced when the Governor 
exercised his power to control 10 percent of the Wagner-Peyser 
allocation and channeled those funds into job-generating 
activities.
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Another option is to emphasize linkage with other programs in an attempt to 
realize significant interactions. This is illustrated by the following:
JTPA staff members regard their state as one of the leaders in 
linking JTPA and economic development. (Their assessment- is 
based on active participation in National Governor's Association 
programs.) Much of the linkage first came about when the 
Governor pressed his Offices of Planning and Economic Development 
to work closely to develop his Small Business Revitalization 
Program. Now there is also a linkage between the JTPA and Small 
Cities CDBG programs. CDBG RFPs got points for proposing to use 
JTPA participants (first source agreements).
A more innovative approach is being used in a large eastern state with 
severe employment problems:
Since the state's economic environment will be the legacy of the 
current administration, the Governor has played an active role in 
JTPA program development. In addition to the strong JTPA 
economic development links reported in the State's Phase 1 
report, the Governor has acted to strengthen those links during 
PY84. Consider two such actions: (1) PICs must now establish 
coordinative mechanisms with the high-tech center nearest to 
them. (2) The DOL recently requested that the State Council 
actively support the Governor's request for a $190 million bond 
issue for economic development. JTPA was written into the 
Governor's proposal.
A number of other states show moderate linkage as evidenced by the 
following:
At the state level, the more direct JTPA links with economic 
development are with the 8 percent education set-aside and Title 
III than with Title IIA. The Governor actively supports a strong 
economic development role for community colleges, for example, 
through the establishment of Business Assistance Centers. (Eight 
percent funds are being used to help Centers provide contract 
procurement assistance for local businesses in PY84.)
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A weaker connection is indicated by this statement from an associate in a 
midwestern state:
Although there is lip service paid to the development link with 
JTPA, it is not a strong one. As a development staff person told 
me, they make sure they offer JTPA services to prospective 
employers, but since every state has the program, it isn't 
considered much of a selling point.
There appears to be a slight connection between the degree of private 
sector participation and the degree of linkage of JTPA with economic 
development efforts. Because of confounding influences of the economic climate 
and structural issues, however, it is very hard to measure this precisely.
In about half the states, there are only weak links or none at all between 
JTPA and state economic development efforts. For the most part, these are 
states that do not have an unemployment problem or states where the JTPA 
program most closely resembles CETA.
Perhaps the most revealing statement of all comes from an associate in a 
small eastern state:
It would be reasonably accurate to say that JTPA has not been a 
very high priority with the Governor, but that his interest in 
the program is likely to increase over the next year. The 
Governor is very concerned about economic development, but thus 
far has not found the operational "link" between JTPA and that 
goal. If a strategy can be forged to combine the workings of 
education, technology, and employment and training programs, the 
Governor's interest in JTPA can be expected to grow rapidly.
This may well be the key. While one associate reported in Phase 1 that the 
private sector chairperson of the SJTCC claimed that "Training the
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dlsadvantaged without creating new jobs is like clapping with one hand," it 
remains a difficult thing to do. Not enough is understood about the way jobs 
are created in the private sector so it is hard for policymakers to coordinate 
policies in a general way.
Private Sector Participation at the SPA Level
The major avenues for private sector participation in the SDAs are the 
Private Industry Councils, jointly charged with planning and oversight 
functions with local elected officials. The Act mandates a majority of private 
sector participation on the PIC, including the chairperson, so the possibility 
of private sector control of the PIC is very real. There were two early 
concerns that emerged in the implementation of JTPA, however, which cast doubt 
on whether the private sector would actually take control as the Congress 
intended.
The first question was how long it would take for private sector PIC 
members to achieve a grasp of the program sufficient to make a useful input to 
shaping the program. The will to use one's influence is not enough, it is also 
necessary to understand the program. Since most of the other PIC members were 
expected to be experienced CETA hands, there was concern that the private 
sector members would be left at the starting gate.
The other major concern was whether private sector representatives would 
actually take an interest in employment and training programs for the 
economically dlsadvantaged. While creating more opportunities for the 
disadvantaged is in everyone's interest, it was difficult to see just how the
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employers of private sector PIC members would benefit directly from this 
activity. With early concerns about possible conflict of interest issues, some 
argued that business might have more to gain if they were not affiliated with 
the program. If PIC member firms were to be denied OJT slots or other possible 
program benefits, it would be asking a lot for them to serve purely out of a 
sense of corporate responsibility.
In actuality, there may have been more private sector carryover experience 
than anticipated. Among the 27 PICs in this study where a determination can be 
made, in 12 cases (44 percent) more than 20 percent of the private sector PIC 
members had previous PIC experience under CETA Title VII. Nevertheless, there 
were 10 PICs among the 27 (37 percent) where none of the private sector 
representatives had any previous experience. Thus the strong possibility 
existed that in some local areas at least private sector members and private 
sector input were not effective in the early stages of JTPA implementation.
The field results from Phase 1A demonstrated that these concerns were not 
groundless. Among the 22 SDAs reviewed at that time, only 6 showed local PIC 
action that was primary or dominant vis-a-vis local elected officials. Another 
6 PICs were classified as advisory, but attempting to move to co-equal status. 
A total of 10 PICs were found to be purely advisory to local elected officials; 
in other words, the local partnership had not yet been consummated on terms 
favorable to private sector participation and direction.
At the conclusion of the transition year, the Phase 2 field observations 
yield a very different picture. In 22 of the 38 SOAs observed (58 percent),
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the PIC was determined to be primary or dominant in influence in determining 
the content of the PY 1984 services plan. In another 7 SDAs (18 percent), the 
PIC and the LEO were judged to be co-equal. In only 9 of 38 SDAs (24 percent) 
was the PIC purely advisory in determining local OTPA program plan-s for PY 
1984. This is a rather remarkable turnaround in PIC (and private sector) 
influence over the program in less than one full year.
From a mid-sized SDA in the Midwest:
The private sector influence appears to be dominant on the PIC. 
The chair of the PIC and the chair of all three committees are 
private sector persons. There is no indication that the interest 
of the private sector representatives has declined and, indeed, 
from all indications the interest of the private sector members 
has increased during the transition year. Their influence is 
clearly dominant on the PIC. There has been good attendance at 
the meetings and at approximately 95 percent of the meetings at 
least 15 of the 19 PIC members have attended.
An associate in a large SDA in the West reports:
The interest in and involvement by the private sector is strong 
at the level of the PIC and its committees. As already reported, 
private sector representatives dominate the PIC, they were 
primary in the development of the PY84 plan, and have organized 
themselves into committees apparently appropriate to the tasks at 
hand. From our interviews and from attendance at the PIC 
meetings, it is clear that the PIC members want an active role. 
They are particularly sensitive to the mayor or board of 
supervisors intruding into what they define as their turf. The 
charge to the ad hoc "policy" committee is to develop policy 
statements and procedures which will reduce such intrusions in 
the future.
From a medium-sized city in the East:
Contrary to expectations that private sector interest might 
decline when the learning curve flattened after the transition 
year, private sector representatives indicate continuing high
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levels of involvement and commitment to PIC activities as well as 
the need for far more aggressive marketing of JTPA so as to 
elicit greater private sector participation as service providers.
And from another mid-sized SDA in the Midwest:
It appears that the partnership is developing in this SDA. 
Because of some excellent leadership and a receptive staff and 
service providers, the private sector has felt good about its 
ability to be listened to and to learn from their experience. A 
highly vocal, fairly critical private sector Council member told 
us he was pleased by the process by which his comments have been 
received and used by staff, and he is eager to serve the rest of 
his three-year term.
i,
More specific illustrations of PIC influence on JTPA policy are apparent in 
reports such as the following:
The primary role of the PIC is setting policy. This is done at a 
monthly meeting of the entire board and through very active 
committees. In setting the PY84 plan the staff first met with 
the PIC to obtain their general preferences with regard to policy 
options. A draft of the plan was then written by the PIC's staff 
and that draft was submitted to all PIC members and all LEO 
members. Two committees of the PIC, the Program Development 
Committee and the Executive Committee, met to provide specific 
input on the plan. Changes they suggested were made and some of 
the changes were substantive as opposed to stylistic. The LEO, 
in contrast, did not have any substantive recommendations with 
regard to the plan. Following a revised draft the plan was 
submitted to the PIC and LEO at a joint meeting. When policy 
issues arise and the full PIC cannot meet the chair of the PIC is 
consulted by the staff in all cases.
Another example from a large eastern city:
Clearly, there is an increasing realization among several PIC 
members, especially among the private sector members, that, under 
the JTPA, the PIC has planning, monitoring, and oversight 
responsibilities for the entire SDA program.
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After the PY84 was written and submitted the PIC decided to make 
a major change to the plan. They decided to increase the portion 
of the SDA's Title II-A funds going to the PIC's program from 15 
percent to 30 percent. Several private sector members lobbied 
for the change, first within the PIC's Planning Committee and 
then among the entire PIC. The change was vigorously opposed by 
the Executive Director of the administrative entity and several 
non-private sector members. The PIC meeting at which this issue 
came to a vote (June 6) was unique in that most of the members 
were present. The vote was 11 to 7 in favor of the change. 
Since the PIC and the Mayor must both agree on the plan, the 
question was raised at the PIC meeting about the Mayor's views. 
The Executive Director of the administrative entity reported that 
in a conversation with the Mayor the previous day the Mayor 
indicated that he wanted to maintain the 85-15 percent split. 
However, the Mayor's representative on the PIC (who, 
incidentally, voted for the change) said that the Mayor did not 
convey that view to him. No objection to the PIC's decision ever 
came from the Mayor's office, so the 70-30 split has gone into 
effect.
It is not always the case that there has been a power struggle over the 
role of the PIC. There are many cases where local elected officials were eager 
to transfer policymaking authority to private sector players. From a large 
southern city:
Since the early period of PIC formation, the role of the Mayor 
has been minimal  "he has not interfered" though he has his 
spokesperson on the PIC. The Mayor and the PIC have steered JTPA 
away from the politically charged atmosphere of CETA with its 
pressures to award contracts and participant slots. So far they 
have succeeded; approval of PIC decisions especially of 
contractors, has had the concurrence of the Mayor and City 
Council. The PIC has been primary in formulating the PY84 Plan. 
This is the private sector's program, not the City's.
An associate in a large midwestern SDA reported:
The private sector PIC influence has continued unabated in this 
SDA. The area is very conservative politically, and there is 
general agreement that private sector dominance is appropriate. 
The LEO has the very strong opinion that the private sector 
people will keep the program on the straight and narrow and save 
the LEO a great deal of trouble.
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There are other SDAs where the private sector input has not been dominant, 
of course. From a small rural SDA:
The PIC influence has declined. In essence the program is viewed 
as a public sector matter best left to the county commissioners. 
The PIC is a legitimizing group, a support group in times of 
crises, and a rather insignificant public relations group in 
supporting the program's OJT and placement objectives.
From an associate in a mid-sized midwestern SDA:
The private sector influence in this SDA has not been great. 
With few exceptions, the PIC members from the private sector have 
not been willing to spend a great deal of time on JTPA and have 
not made an effort necessary to learn the programs. Indeed, it 
appears that many of the private sector members did not know what 
they were getting into when they agreed to serve on the PIC. 
Clearly, there is no indication that the private sector influence 
is increasing in this SDA. It is still an open question whether 
the private sector has much interest in JTPA.
At this time, the PIC is not functional. It did not meet in June 
or July but hopes to meet in August. Seven of the 12 private 
sector positions need to be filled either because of resignations 
or because terms of office are expiring. Four private sector 
representatives have recently quit and the PIC cannot operate 
because less than half of its current members are from the 
private sector. The size of the PIC may be reduced in order to 
reduce the number of private sector representatives required on 
the PIC. At most, only five of the private sector members of the 
PIC will continue into PY84. With that type of turnover it is 
unlikely that the PIC will exert much greater influence in the 
near future.
This problem is echoed in the report of an associate from a large rural 
SDA:
In this SDA it does not appear to be as much of a problem of 
declining private sector involvement as a case of private sector 
involvement never developing. At all PIC meetings since the SDA 
became operational (October 1983) designated members have ( 
outnumbered private sector members at PIC meetings. Attendance 
in general is poor at PIC meetings.
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There has been and will continue to be problems with private 
sector involvement in this SDA according to the JTPA director. 
Private sector members have a hard time understanding the entire 
process according to the director, a sentiment echoed by the PIC 
chairman. Many are unwilling to devote the time necessary to 
become truly involved. Some PIC members are members only as a 
favor to the LEO who recommended them.
These experiences are all from SDAs where the private sector influence has 
not been strong relative to LEOs. But there are PICs that are relatively 
inactive even where their influence has been primary to that of the LEO. From 
a medium-sized southern city:
The PIC is a volunteer group with a community service attitude 
about JTPA. As long as the reports from the SDA indicate that 
good work is being done to help needy people and the SDA is 
behaving in a fiscally sound manner, the PIC remains passive and 
happy.
A more individual kind of response was reported by the associate in a small 
rural SDA:
Private sector influence is mixed. Some private sector 
representatives still are very strong participants in the 
process, others are very weak. The agency people on the PIC 
often dominate because of their background and expertise, but 
some private sector people are "holding their own" with the 
agency people.
Maintaining private sector interest will be somewhat difficult in 
that travel distance and time away from business are difficult 
for these small business people. Also, there are only limited 
members of these people in these six counties available and 
willing to devote much time to PIC affairs.
Lastly, there are some SDAs where the issue of PIC influence and control is 
still at issue. In a mid-sized, rural SDA in the West, the contrast in values 
between private sector dominated PIC and a public sector administrative entity 
is very clear:
 Page 21
There does seem to be a lot of conflict between the PIC and the 
administrative entity at the present time. Both groups recognize 
many of the apparent sources of the conflict, and both think it 
will subside in the near future, but it surely is there now. 
From the perspective of the administrative entity, the PIC is 
pushing JTPA programs into inappropriate directions and 
interfering unnecessarily in the day-to-day operations of- 
programs. The administrative entity believes they are doing a 
very good job, particularly with OJT, and have the performance 
data to prove it. They have been running job training programs 
since the early 1960s, and know what they, are up to. People in 
the administrative entity think the important PIC members do not 
appreciate the degree to which they (the administrative entity) 
are willing to cooperate and actually have cooperated. There 
also seems to be some suspicion in the administrative entity 
concerning the goals of some PIC members. People in the 
administrative entity have expressed a concern that some of the 
more active PIC members have made the goal of economic 
development primary to training disadvantaged workers.
From the PIC's perspective, the administrative entity has been 
less than cooperative, has frustated the policymaking role of the 
PIC, and has a limited and archaic view of what kinds of programs 
which should be undertaken under JTPA. PIC members do not think 
the administrative entity has given the PIC adequate staff 
support, and has tried to push their own programs and not allowed 
the PIC to develop enough new kinds of programs. They think 
people in the administrative entity are too tied to concepts left 
over from their CETA days, and, thus are resistant to creative 
programs. In particular, the PIC chairman (he resigned effective 
August 1) is quite interested in economic development and sees 
JTPA as an important tool in the region's economic development 
arsenal. He is frustrated by the lack of enthusiasm in the 
administrative entity for coordinating JTPA programs with 
economic development efforts.
From a large western city where the PIC has been judged as co-equal with 
the LEO:
The PIC interest has been strong since the beginning of JTPA. At 
least nine of the current members served on the Title VII PIC 
including the current chairperson. His goal is to get the PIC 
functioning as a separate group, and he has been fighting for a 
separate staff since October 1983. He believes business leaders 
feel this is the only way the program can work. The private 
sector will not participate if JTPA is run as a "warmed over 
version of CETA because they feel it is money down a rat hole." 
He wants a staff which is loyal to the PIC and which will follow 
the PIC 's direction.
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There is a lot of variation among the SDAs; so much that it is hard to 
discern any central tendency. However, it is worth noting that only 2 PICs of 
9 that were determined to be purely advisory in Phase 1A are still in that 
category. Among the 6 PICs deemed to be advisory but attempting to move to 
co-equal status, only 1 is still advisory to the LEO. Thus, there has been 
strong movement in the direction of private sector, influence.
This is confirmed by field associates' direct reports as well. As of the 
end of the transition year, the trend of private sector participation was 
upward in 13 SDAs and downward in only 7. In 18 SDAs the associates saw no 
particular trend. Thus it would appear that the private sector influence is 
still on the rise at the end of the transition year.
Where this has not occurred, it seems to have been due primarily to a lack 
of interest on the part of the LEO or other controlling authority in sharing 
their power. Where the private sector has been invited, they seem to have been 
a willing partner. Clearly there are problems of distance in rural SDAs and 
problems of commitment among some individual PIC members. But overall the 
partnership appears to be healthy and robust.
Only 6 of these 38 SDAs have a PIC that is the grant recipient and 
administrative entity. So only 6 of the PICs must by definition have attained 
primary status. The fact that over three-fourths of the PICs studied had 
attained at least co-equal status with the LEO in determining the contents of 
the PY84 plan is testimony to the willingness of the private sector to 
participate and the willingness of the public sector to welcome their 
participation.
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Other Private Sector Influences
In addition to the program planning and oversight functions discussed in 
the previous two sections, there are other roles that private sector people are 
playing in JTPA programs. As indicated earlier, there are 6 of the 38 SDAs in 
the sample where the PIC itself is the grant recipient and administrative 
entity. Obviously in these cases the private sector PIC members are involved 
in all the usual functions associated with overseeing a major undertaking. But 
aside from direct managerial input, what other contributions have private 
sector participation in JTPA produced?
Even when the PIC is not dominant, it can provide a useful shield for local
elected officials anxious about possible liability or fraud and abuse issues.
From an associate in a large midwestern SDA:
The LEO depends heavily on the PIC to provide assurances that the 
program is operating in accordance with law and with good 
business practice. The LEO in this SDA is surprisingly 
unconcerned about program issues, including liability for 
disallowed costs.
Depending on the past experience with CETA, it can be very comforting to 
have someone else to point at if things go wrong. This is particularly true 
under the conditions of uncertainty created by the lack of authoritative 
regulations under JTPA. If the locality has had unpleasant experiences with 
disallowed costs in the past, this is particularly likely.
There is another productive function to private sector input when it comes 
time to pull the plug on an unproductive contractor. According to the 
associate in a large city SDA:
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They and the new private sector members feel no pressure to fund 
poor service providers. The private sector orientation of JTPA 
seems to offer the rationale for cutting them off, an orientation 
which was not present under CETA.
Undoubtedly the private sector majority on the PIC makes such jdecisions 
easier to make and harder to overturn through political means.
Another example where the business orientation may have worked to the 
advantage of the program, though in a rather unusual way, is the following 
quote from an associate in a large midwestern city:
Several factors have contributed to this private sector 
influence. First, the PIC persuaded the city to reduce the 
administrative cost burden. This was a clear indication of the 
usefulness of private sector business knowledge in bringing about 
change. Second, the PIC and PIC Planning Committee view staff as 
extremely open and interested in sharing information to bring 
about needed changes.
If the private sector dominated PIC was prepared to go to bat to raise the 
administrative cost limit, it must have been a persuasive case.
More interesting and more common than these examples of PIC influence are 
those relating to marketing the JTPA program to the community and, more 
particularly, to the business sector. One example from a state that has not 
shown a great deal of private sector involvement in program planning or 
operation:
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The state Chamber of Commerce is quite actively involved in 
promoting JTPA throughout the state, and has had a major impact. 
Working with Job Service staff and occasionally members of the 
regional PICs, they have made local presentations in over 140 
communities statewide that have been attended by over 4,000 
employers. These meetings cover a range of topics, including use 
of TJTC, summer youth programs, and others besides II-A and III 
programs under JTPA, but there is no question that the word is 
out. For example, with the help of some 6 percent money, an 
employer outreach program was conducted in one region that 
resulted in 60 requests from employers for OJT contracts. Before 
the program, these employers hadn't heard 1 of JTPA.
Another statement from an associate in a medium-sized SDA in the East:
Private sector influence has increased appreciably since last 
year. Private sector representatives to the PIC have been 
successful in their attempt to involve the SDA in development 
efforts. Representatives of the PIC are now invited to all 
meetings with firms contemplating relocation in the county. In 
addition, private sector representatives have influenced the 
actions of other area organizations such as the Chamber of 
Commerce. Companies and individuals not previously aware of the 
JTPA, are now referred to the administrative entity for 
information and assistance. Private sector influence is also 
responsible for a policy which emphasizes OJT.
A report from a large southern city combines the public relations aspects 
with specific functional contributions by private sector interests:
A significant accomplishment of the PIC has been recruiting other 
private sector members to serve on PIC committees to review 
proposals, to validate tests to determine program completion and 
to review, on-site, service providers. At the most recent PIC 
meeting a "PIC Associate" category was approved to designate 
these individuals and others who will be recruited to expand 
private sector influence and participation.
The PIC review of proposals and subsequent evaluation of those 
funded draws heavily on private sector members. Several members 
recounted spending three days exclusively reviewing proposals 
both for TY and PY84. These reviews are done according to 
industry/occupational clusters by those with that expertise for 
example, review of all clerical training is done by a 
subcommittee of members and associates knowledgeable about 
clerical occupations. The on-site PIC evaluations, likewise, are
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conducted by knowledgeable members and associates. Additional 
private sector influence is exerted through the advisory councils 
which the PIC requires of each service provider for their JTPA 
programs. These members are mostly from the private sector and 
their responsibility is to help define skill requirement needs by 
program graduates, develop and refine curriculum and training 
methodologies.
Another description of the way in which private sector dominated PICs can 
find a way to meet the needs of employers is the following:
The major innovation has been to build flexibility into the 
process to permit making amendments in OJT contracts with private 
companies to accommodate changes in their need for trained 
manpower without requiring formal and time consuming 
renegotiation of proposals. Additional slots can be added 
quickly to meet additional needs. This has been seen as very 
helpful to start-up companies. The PIC will only fund a third of 
the need for slots of such companies. This has been done to take 
into account layoffs and additions, so as not to cut into the 
JTPA slots and, as a result, cause their OJT contract to be 
cancelled. Another change adopted by the PIC was the use of 
broader job descriptions, which give companies some flexibility 
without them having to modify their contracts. An example given 
was a job description that would permit an employer to switch 
between welder helper and welder.
Another type of private sector influence is the debureaucratization of 
state and local governmental structures. Private sector people have a lack of 
respect for traditional bureaucratic boundaries that can be very helpful. From 
a state with strong private sector participation on the SJTCC:
The Council has become somewhat more influential in the past 
year. While this is difficult to pinpoint because the Governor 
"accepts" both its transition year (1984) plan and program year 
(1984) plan, observers of the Council think that it is becoming 
more "surefooted" in analyzing problems. For example, the 
Council, as part of the implementation of coordination criteria 
for the SDAs, established a policy of cooperative agreements to 
be drawn up between the SDAs and various state and local 
agencies. This Spring, the SDAs complained that the governmental 
agencies were not being as "cooperative" as the SDAs were 
expected to be. The Council then began to pressure the Governor
 informally to mandate parallel requirements on agencies within 
his purview. While no formal action has occurred yet, it is 
likely that such will take place for the plan for 1985-86.
But perhaps the most far-reaching impact of the private sector 
participation in JTPA has been in the orientation to the demand for labor 
(i.e., business 1 needs) as opposed to the supply of labor (individuals' 
needs). This is exemplified in the following quote from an associate in an SDA 
that is still battling openly over these issues:
The extent of the private sector influence in this SDA has 
certainly not diminished thus far. Many of the most active 
members are from the private sector, and the level of their 
activity remains quite high. The executive committee effectively 
is the PIC. Five of the eight executive committee members have 
private sector connections. The impact of this private sector 
input is difficult to sort out. Nearly every meeting has the, 
obligatory reference to the inability of public entities to ever 
get anything done, but I think that hostility is more ceremonial 
than substantive. More important, I think, are two very 
different types of private sector influence. First, there is a 
tendency to think about the dimensions of the labor market in 
terms of what businesses need. Thus, there is a tendency to 
think in terms of economic development and what skills are needed 
by business, and a possibly diminished concern for getting people 
into permanent, good jobs. The second influence centers on how 
the PIC operates. The main difference between day-to-day 
operations in the small business settings familiar to our PIC's 
private sector members, and the public sector is the necessity to 
consider such things as open meetings laws, avoiding the 
appearance of conflict of interest, and the need to follow state 
bidding procedures in assigning contracts. The key members in 
this PIC are influenced by the private sector influence in both 
of these ways. They think of job training in different terms 
than the public sector oriented people at the administrative 
entity, and they are continually frustrated by the constraints 
placed on JTPA operations simply because they are using public 
funds.
There does seem to be a very fundamental difference in orientation between 
many of the private sector people and many of the public sector people. This 
is certainly a major issue in the conversion from CETA to JTPA over the past
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year. The private sector participants are much less likely to define the 
mission of employment and training programs in individual terms. Once the 
individual is put back to work, that is a successful treatment, regardless of 
other needs. Public sector CETA managers and service deliverers have not 
generally defined their mission so simply and straightforwardly. Emphasis has 
been on placement, yes, but much more concern was traditionally expressed about 
the individual's general needs. Thus the old CETA hands find the diminished 
level of support services troubling, while private sector participants are more 
likely to feel that if a participant can get a job without support services, 
providing them would not be cost effective.
Perhaps the new spirit of private sector influence is captured best in this 
simple statement from an associate in a southern state:
If the private sector dominates the agenda of the SJTCC and 
dictates its direction, it is not obvious. A more realistic 
assessment is probably that of a role of keeping things from 
sliding back or coming to resemble the sound or appearance of the 
"old-CETA program."
Whatever the eventual outcome of this reorientation of our employment and 
training efforts, it must be conceded that national policymakers knew what they 
wanted to accomplish in replacing the Comprehensive Employment and Training 
Act. The desire to include private sector input in state level program 
decisions and a full private sector partnership in local program decisions must 
be termed a success.
